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Improvements to the delivery of ecosystem services from farmland such as habitat protection, 
biodiversity conservation, carbon sequestration and pest management, can be obtained by 
adopting pro-conservation land uses on properties otherwise devoted to profit-based 
agriculture (Swinton et al. 2007). Adopting such pro-conservation land uses is typically 
costly to the landowner/farmer, meaning that they may require financial compensation for 
implementing them (Armsworth et al. 2012). As a result, Payment for Ecosystem Services 
(PES) schemes have been introduced by conservation agencies in many countries to 
incentivize these changes in land management (Wunder 2005). For example, the 
Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) in the U.S. has disbursed nearly $26 billion to retire 
36.8 million acres of farmland from agriculture to reduce soil erosion and preserve 
approximately 1.8 million acres of wetland habitats (Kirwan et al. 2005; Ferris and Siikamäki 
2009; Cowan 2010). In Europe an increasing fraction of total spending on agriculture goes to 
funding agri-environmental schemes (Cooper et al. 2009) with further increases planned 
under reforms to the post-2013 Common Agricultural Policy. 
 
In the context of increasing the environmental benefits from farmland management, an 
important issue is that the spatial coordination of land management efforts can generate 
environmental benefits more effectively for an important set of ecological and biodiversity 
quality indicators (Hanley et al. 2012). Encouraging landowners to enrol adjacent land 
parcels which are of high ecological value by attaching greater sign-up payments to them has 
been shown to generate higher environmental benefits such as improved biodiversity benefits 
from spatially contiguous habitats than scenarios where the incentives are not spatially 
differentiated (Drechschler et al. 2010, Wätzold et al. 2010). In many instances, land 
management of geographically proximate (or even adjacent) parcels/properties for creating 
contiguous habitat of at least a critical minimum size, and establishing connections between 
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patches to create habitat corridor linkages which facilitate species mobility may be beneficial 
for biodiversity conservation  (Margules and Pressey 2000; Dallimer et al. 2010). Further, 
spatial clustering of organic farm operations can lead to lower negative impacts on water 
quality by minimizing runoff, can mitigate losses from retiring land to create buffers 
preventing pesticide spill-over from neighboring conventional farms, and can even reduce 
certification costs of organic farmers (Parker and Munroe 2007). Finally, creation of large 
contiguous areas of non-crop habitat for natural predators in the landscape can be more 
successful in eradicating pests than strategies which ignore such spatially agglomerated 
habitat management (Landis et al. 2000; Zhang et al. 2010). 
 
One approach to achieving spatial coordination of conservation land uses and land 
management is the Agglomeration Bonus (AB) subsidy scheme (Parkhurst et al. 2002; 
Parkhurst and Shogren 2007).
1
 The AB is a two-part payment scheme comprising a base level 
compensation for all participants and a top-up bonus which they receive if their neighbors 
also participate and implement similar pro-conservation land use practices on their properties. 
By rewarding coordinated actions across space, land management decisions of neighboring 
landowners under the AB scheme can be considered to be strategic interactions in a 
coordination game. This game has multiple Nash equilibria which can be Pareto ranked in 
terms of payoffs. The existence of multiple equilibria can, however, give rise to coordination 
failure. Experimental evidence provided by Parkhurst and Shogren (2005; 2007) and 
Warziniack et al. (2007) indicates that 1) repeated interaction between players during which 
they become increasingly familiar with the game and are able to view the land choice 
networks produced as a result of everyone’s choices,  2) simple spatial targets to which 
                                                     
1
An alternative approach investigated in the literature is auctions for spatially-coordinated land management 
project procurement (e.g., Windle et al. 2009). 
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participants can coordinate with relative ease and 3) non-binding pre-play communication 
prior to making a choice, can lead to spatial coordination. Successful coordination on socially 
desirable land use outcomes is also more likely on landscapes with fewer participants owing 
to the difficulty of coordination in larger groups (Banerjee et al. 2012).  
 
A key issue that has received limited attention in the AB literature, and which forms the focus 
of this article, is that the outcome of strategic interactions between landowners depends on 
the amount of information available to them about other landowners’ land management 
choices. This article reports results of a laboratory experiment that varies the information 
each participant receives about the land use decisions others make within the purview of an 
AB scheme. Our interest in this issue is motivated by both the nature of relationships within 
farming communities and the existing scientific literature on equilibrium selection and 
individual behavior in coordination games. Interpersonal relationships in agricultural 
communities are a product of socio-economic ties and the private properties’ locations on the 
farming landscape. Farmers may routinely lend and borrow machinery to/from neighbors, 
lobby together to influence local or national policy determination, or become members of the 
same (regional) input-purchasing and marketing cooperatives (Hanson et al. 2004; Parker and 
Munroe 2007). These ties facilitate the generation and flow of information which is 
conducive to cooperation with respect to (local) biodiversity and natural resources 
management (Pretty and Ward 2001; Pretty and Smith 2004; Schusler and Decker 2004; 
Isaac et al. 2007).  
 
Under the AB scheme, where the economic returns to farmers from land management actions 
are a product of strategic interactions with their neighbors, varying the levels of information 
available to a farmer about their neighbors’ actions is likely to change their land use decisions 
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and conservation payments earned. The literature on the impact of information on individual 
decisions in strategic settings supports this claim. Experimental studies suggest that providing 
more information to subjects increases economic efficiency in terms of Nash equilibria 
selected in coordination games (Berninghaus and Ehrhart 2001; Devetag 2003) and trust 
games (Bracht and Feltovich 2009). Yet Wilson and Sell (1997) find that more information 
reduces efficiency in public good games, while in the study by Duffy and Feltovich (2002) 
there is no significant impact of providing information about others’ choices on game 
outcomes. Thus, the impact of information on choices and the Nash equilibria selected is a 
function of the nature of the strategic environment and the features of the game itself. 
Therefore, in determining the effectiveness of an AB based policy scheme in delivering 
environmental benefits via spatially coordinated land management, we need to explicitly 
consider the impact of varying the information available to landowners, on their land use 
actions.  
 
This article analyses the impact of varying the information available to student subjects who 
assume the role of landowners in a laboratory experiment. The laboratory allows us to 
exercise control over the strategic environment – the testbed (Plott 1997) – and to evaluate 
the impact of the information treatment on land management decisions and types of spatial 
patterns produced. The controlled (and context free) laboratory environment permits the 
“wind-tunnel testing” of the AB incentive scheme for internal validity and analysis of general 
principles of human behavior under the treatment conditions (Schram 2005) before it can be 
tested in richer field contexts with actual landowners whose motivations for participation (or 
not) in conservation programs have both economic and non-economic drivers (Bowers and 
Lane 2009, Sheeder and Lynne 2011).  
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The experiments involve subjects arranged on a circular local network where each subject is 
directly linked to a subset of all individuals in the group (a direct neighbor each in the 
clockwise and anti-clockwise direction) and indirectly to everyone else through their direct 
linkages (Jackson 2010). Within this network setup, we vary the information subjects receive 
by way of feedback after they have made a choice in the AB coordination game. In the 
baseline control sessions, subjects obtain information about the choices and payoffs of their 
two direct neighbors. This information feedback format is similar to those implemented in 
prior AB experiments. In the treatment sessions subjects’ information sets additionally 
include knowledge about the choices and payoffs of their closest indirect neighbors, i.e., their 
direct neighbors’ direct neighbors. This treatment specification is different from existing AB 
research and is motivated by the fact that while people may be aware of the strategic 
interactions within their closest domain of interaction i.e. their neighbors, friends, and/or 
networked partners, they usually do not have full information about all relevant strategic 
interactions in the economy or within their social network beyond this closest domain (Alós-
Ferrer and Weidenholzer 2008). Moreover it is quite likely that the impact of indirectly 
linked networked individuals’ choices on a single player’s behavior is decreasing with the 
distance between them. Given these factors, our experimental treatment investigates the role 
of the extra feedback information on the emergence and persistence of efficient coordination 
and effective ecosystem services provision in a strategic AB policy environment. 
 
Note that the impact of more information is ex ante unclear. Receiving information about 
actions selected by one’s neighbors and neighbors’ neighbors may facilitate coordination on 
the efficient Nash equilibrium; but the opposite outcome may be obtained as well – if one 
observes that the more distant subject did not choose the Pareto efficient strategy, one may 
anticipate that one’s direct neighbor may also decide the same implying that one is better off 
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refraining from choosing the efficient strategy too. Our experimental results indicate that 
providing more information produces a significant difference in subject behavior and 
resultant AB configurations. Overall there is more efficient coordination in the groups with 
more information relative to those where information exchange is limited to direct neighbors 
only. The positive impact of extra information on coordination is substantial, but we also find 
that, given our payoff parameterization, providing the extra information is not able to prevent 
the decrease in the share of subjects coordinating on the Pareto efficient equilibrium over 
time. While in early periods of the experiments more information results in a larger share of 
subjects coordinating on the efficient Nash equilibrium, with repeated interaction subjects’ 
behavior switches towards the inefficient, Nash equilibrium with efficient coordination 
persisting at the localized level only.  
 
The Model  
Consider   players, indexed          representing landowners, each of whom has a fixed 
position on a landscape represented by a circular local network. This network representation 
simultaneously introduces a spatial component into the strategic setting and captures the 
features of farming communities in which social networks play an important role in 
sustainable resource management (Bodin 2009). On this circular landscape the neighborhood 
structure is symmetric whereby all   landowners have two direct neighbors: one each in the 
clockwise and anti-clockwise direction.
2
 These two individuals make up the local 
                                                     
2
 As there are no edge effects, employing a circular network structure implies that all subjects face identical 
decision problems. This ensures that we are able to isolate the impact of the information treatment (that changes 
the subjects’ strategic uncertainty in the coordination game) on choices and AB performance without having to 
worry about potential confounding problems arising from subjects having different levels of strategic 
uncertainty owing to a varying number of neighbors. 
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neighborhood of a player. Landowners are indirectly linked to other networked individuals 
via their direct neighbors. This network is illustrated in figure 1. 
 
< Figure 1 about here > 
 
A landowner’s choice set in the AB game is related to how they manage their land. Each 
landowner   owns one plot of land, and can choose between two land management options: 
      . Option   refers to conservation management on agricultural land (“land sharing”: 
Balmford et al. 2012), and   refers to retirement of cropland such as under the CRP with land 
being converted to nature farming, what Balmford et al. (2012) call “land sparing”. Both land 
management options thus provide conservation services, but the N type more so than G.
3
  
 
Let us now specify society’s benefits from environment friendly land management under the 
two options   and    Any parcel of land under either land management option yields 
ecosystem service benefits,      , and let these “stand-alone” benefits be larger under   than 
under  .4 Let us assume that        and        . Environmental agglomeration 
                                                     
3
 Of course, the third option is not participating and using the land for intensive agriculture. This possibility is, 
however, not implemented in the experiment as our focus is on the role of information in influencing 
landowners’ choice of one conservation strategy over the other. We thus implicitly assume that compensation is 
sufficiently generous for both conservation strategies to make participation incentive compatible. This 
assumption is not at odds with reality as PES schemes have been known to overcompensate landowners in order 
to guarantee participation (Kirwan et al. 2005, Munoz-Pina et al. 2008). 
4
 Uncultivated or retired land,  , usually provides good habitat for those species that do not prefer the open 
nature of cultivated land, such as the boreal toad (Keinath and McGee 2005) and birds like the sage grouse 
(Crawford et al. 2004). Non-crop habitats on retired tracts like flower patches and hedgerows are beneficial for 
increasing the populations of natural pollinators such as honey bees (Carvell et al. 2007). On the other hand, the 
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benefits exist for both types of land management options. We assume that these benefits are 
larger for choice   than for   given the nature of ecosystem services delivered from land 
sparing and sharing options. Also regardless of network size  , we assume that 
agglomeration benefits denoted by       are generated on the basis of similar land use 
choices made by player  ’s direct neighbors only.  
 
Let     denote the number of neighboring plots adjacent to that of landowner i, that are under 
the same land management option    as the plot of landowner i. Then the total agglomeration 
benefits are denoted by          for       . Let the benefit values for each strategy be 
        and        . Hence, for any given value of     (which, in our circular local 
network setup is equal to 0, 1 or 2), both the benefits,      , and the agglomeration 
conservation benefits,      , are strictly larger for   than for  . We assume that the 
landscape-level environmental benefit contribution of a landowner choosing a management 
option depends on the direct neighbors’ decisions, but not on those of their indirect neighbors 
in order to capture the spatial nature of environmental processes and hence benefits, which 
are often decreasing with increasing geographical distance. Also, the conservation benefits 
provided by selecting N are the same independent of whether the direct and indirect neighbors 
to one’s left (right) choose GN(NG), or NN. The same is true for the G option.  
 
In addition to the conservation benefits of land use, society values agricultural profits too, and 
these are larger under G than under N. Let       denote a landowner’s profits from 
agriculture. When land is managed for agricultural production, profits are positive (     
                                                                                                                                                                     
cultivated land management option   is conducive to species that like the “openness” of such fields. Meadow 
birds such as the burrowing and short-eared owls (Holt and Leasure 1993) typically rely on grasslands for 
nesting and hunting but thrive less well on land retired from agriculture and abandoned to nature. 
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  )) whilst they are zero when land is abandoned to nature (      )). Depending on the 
land use choice of direct neighbors, the social benefits provided by landowner i’s land use 
choice reads as: 
 
                                                                          (1)                        
 
We are interested in the efficiency of land use decisions in the presence of agglomeration 
benefits, and not in how rents are allocated between landowners and the government (or the 
tax payer). For simplicity, we therefore assume that landowners receive the full social 
benefits generated by their pro-environmental land use activities, i.e., they receive subsidies 
equal to               . On the basis of our model, the government thus implements a 
payment scheme where the subsidy is set at the Pigouvian level
5,6
 and expression (1) is the 
total payment received by landowner i when choosing land option   . This specification of the 
payoff function is similar to the one implemented by Parkhurst et al. (2002) and Parkhurst and 
Shogren (2007) where landowners’ payoffs depend upon the management option and the 
number of participating neighbors choosing that same action. 
 
                                                     
5
 By making this assumption we ignore the fact that raising funds for subsidies results in welfare losses to 
society because taxes tend to be distortionary.  
6
 The reader may argue that given these modeling decisions the regulator can implement the optimal pattern by 
setting the subsidy equal to 55 or higher if landowners choose N, and zero otherwise. This will make choosing N 
a dominant strategy, independent of what the other landowners choose – there is no coordination problem. 
While this is correct, this scheme is not informative in explaining how subjects behave in the presence of 
subsidies where their payoffs depend on both their own and others’ decisions. Moreover, in the real world the 
regulator may not be fully aware of both the opportunity costs of land conservation and the conservation 
benefits from agglomeration. Then paying landowners the social benefits of their actions would ensure that 
social welfare is maximized with certainty. 
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Using the AB payoff function from equation (1), table 1 presents the social (and private) 
welfare associated with each land management option and corresponding payoffs associated 
with the AB scheme involving a landowner and their two direct neighbors. On the basis of 
this payoff table, the AB scheme resembles the Stag-Hunt coordination game. This three-
player game has two pure strategy Nash equilibria where all players choose G or N. These 
Nash equilibria are Pareto ranked in terms of payoffs. The payoffs for coordination on N is 90 
while the payoffs for coordination on G is 80 – implying that the all-N equilibrium is the 
Pareto dominant one. On the other hand the Nash equilibrium corresponding to G is the risk 
dominant Nash equilibrium as the 1) the cost imposed on a player when neighbors deviate 
and 2) the range within which the payoffs for selecting G for any combination of neighbors’ 
strategy choices vary is lower if the player chooses G than N.
7
 At the network level, choice of 
the same strategy by all K players creates a convention: the Pareto efficient convention all-N 
or the risk dominant all-G convention.  
 
Harsanyi and Selten (1988) argue that in such coordination games the players’ collective 
rationality regarding higher payoffs will lead them to coordinate to the Pareto efficient Nash 
equilibrium. Yet this outcome is predicated on the risk and payoff dominant Nash equilibria 
corresponding to the same strategy. In our AB policy setting this is not the case as choosing 
the natural land management option  , while lucrative, is riskier relative to strategy   as it 
yields a higher payoff loss when neighbors don’t coordinate on N. In an environment where 
every individual is subject to strategic uncertainty about other players’ choices, this relative 
risk ranking may make   more likely than  . The combination of direct and indirect links on 
local networks increases players’ strategic uncertainty even further. These features, in turn, 
may prevent the achievement of the social optimum and lead to the inefficient outcome – a 
                                                     
7
 Following Harsanyi and Selten (1988), the deviation loss associated with G is 70 and with N is 30.  
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scenario referred to as coordination failure. On the basis of this setup and our conjectures, this 
study explores the impact of varying the amount of information available to subjects about 
their neighbors’ previous choices on their likelihood of choosing N and coordinating on the 
socially optimum all-  outcome.  
 
Experimental Design and Procedures 
We consider twelve subjects arranged on a circle with every subject having a direct neighbor 
to their left and right. These direct neighbors are referred as the clockwise (left) and anti-
clockwise (right) neighbors in the experimental instructions. All subjects are randomly 
assigned an ID ranging from 1 to 12 to preserve player anonymity and identify their direct 
neighbors. For example, the player with ID equal to 1 is directly linked to players with IDs 12 
and 2. Every subject is indirectly connected to the remaining nine players via their direct 
neighbors. Since landowner identity and location does not change regularly on actual 
geographical landscapes, we adopt a fixed matching scheme whereby all networked players’ 
IDs and location remain unchanged during the lifetime of the experiment. Additionally, the 
fixed matching scheme permits us to study the impact of subjects’ reputation for the play of a 
particular strategy on other subjects’ choices.  
 
Each session has 30 periods during which the subjects play the game whose payoffs are 
shown in table 1, with their two direct neighbors. We record data for 12 sessions: 6 baseline 
sessions termed 2INFO and 6 treatment sessions termed 4INFO. The baseline is referred to as 
2INFO as each subject receives feedback about their two direct neighbors’ previous and all 
other past periods’ actions. The label 4INFO signifies that in the treatment sessions a subject 
receives choice information about four players’ actions closest to them on the network: their 
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direct neighbors and their direct neighbors’ direct neighbors’ (closest indirect neighbors).8 
Per our model specification, in both treatments payoffs are determined by own and direct 
neighbors’ choices only.   
 
   < Table 1 about here > 
 
The experiments for this study were conducted at the Laboratory for Economics, 
Management and Auctions (LEMA) at the Pennsylvania State University in February 2012 
using student subjects. In total 144 subjects participated in twelve 12-subject sessions 
resulting in 6 independent observations for each treatment. The show-up fee was US$5 and 
experimental earnings were converted into actual currency at the rate of 150 experimental 
dollars to one U.S. dollar. The experiments were implemented using z-Tree (Fischbacher 
2007) and sessions lasted between 45 and 60 minutes. Average subject earning for the 2INFO 
and 4INFO sessions was US$19.95 and US$22.38 respectively. 
 
At the beginning of every session a figure representing the networked landscape and players’ 
neighbors was shown to the subjects. Figure 1 represents the landscape information shown to 
subjects in the 2INFO sessions. In the 4INFO sessions, the location of the closest indirect 
neighbors were labeled in the figure as well. This diagram is provided in the Appendix.  The 
instructions (which are included in the Appendix) were made available on the computer 
screen and were read aloud to maintain an environment of common knowledge. Subjects 
                                                     
8
 In order to keep the instructions simple, we used the phrase local neighborhood in the instructions for 4INFO 
sessions to refer to the set of direct & indirect neighbors whose responses would be visible to players in all 
periods. However, in the Results section of the article, the phrase local neighborhood refers to the set of direct 
neighbors only. 
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were informed about their role as a landowner with two types of land management actions, 
which would generate payoffs. No other contextual terminology such as ecosystem services, 
biodiversity conservation or endangered species was included in the experimental 
instructions.  
 
We adopted this context free approach to 1) study behavior and land use outcomes while 
subjects were responding to financial incentives generated by the AB payments and 
reputational incentives generated during repeated interactions with the same set of neighbors 
under the two information conditions, and because 2) explicit consideration of non-economic 
motivations towards conservation that typically vary between private landowners would 
impose subject heterogeneity in our experiment which although realistic can potentially 
confound the results of our information treatment (in addition to being orthogonal to it). In 
keeping with the game theoretic nature of the experiment, the instructions mentioned that 
subjects’ payoffs would be influenced by their neighbors’ actions. They were also informed 
that the game would be repeated for 30 periods. Before starting the experiment, all subjects 
participated in a quiz about different features of the experiment to verify their understanding 
of the strategic environment, the game choices and the associated payoffs. 
 
Results 
This section is organized into a discussion of individual choices and spatial configurations on 
the network, followed by the analysis of underlying behavior explaining the experimental 
outcomes. 
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General results 
Figure 2 and table 2 present the average share of N choices for all sessions for both treatments 
over 30 periods. We make two observations. First, the average share of N choices in 2INFO 
falls from 63% to almost zero after 20 periods and then stays under 10% for the remaining 
periods. In 4INFO, N choices fall from 73% in Period 1 to 18% in Period 30 as well. Hence, 
with increasing experience the vast majority of the subjects end up choosing the risk-
dominant option. This long run result corresponds to theoretical evidence on contagion of risk 
dominant choices on local networks provided by Ellison (1993) & Weidenholzer (2010) and 
experimental evidence recorded in Keser et al. (1998) and Berninghaus et al. (2002). The 
reduction in the frequency of efficient N choices and the increase in instances of coordination 
failure is also consistent with experimental evidence obtained in other non-network 
coordination game environments such as the minimum and average effort games (Van Huyck 
et al. 1990, 1991) and public good games (Andreoni 1988, Keser and Van Winden 2000).  
 
An explanation for this result is that over multiple periods of interaction, most subjects’ 
strategic uncertainty in the game gets resolved in favor of G since this can reduce the 
magnitude of payoff loss in the event of their neighbors’ failure to coordinate on the efficient 
N strategy. This result is however markedly different from the previous AB studies by 
Parkhurst and colleagues given their experimental designs which 1) implement a random 
matching protocol, 2) includes non-binding pre-play communication both of which have been 
known to increase the frequency of efficient choice (Parkhurst et al. 2002), 3) don’t consider 
any network effects and 4) at the end of every period announces the spatial configurations 
produced as a result of every subjects’ choices.  
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The second observation is that, while the average share of N choices is falling in 4INFO, in 
every period the value is higher in 4INFO than in 2INFO. Thus, information about choices of 
more players on the network delays the decay in efficient coordination but cannot prevent it: 
if Player   observes that their direct neighbor Player        chooses N but that their indirect 
neighbor Player        chooses G, they may anticipate that Player        will most likely 
switch to G (since choosing G is the best response when neighbors choose different 
strategies) inducing Player   to choose G as well.  
 
In our experiments, transition to G following the above reasoning is likely as the payoff 
matrix produces conditions which are quite adverse for coordination on the efficient 
equilibrium. The payoff difference between the NNN and GGG outcomes is 10. This 
difference is less than the loss associated with choosing N when at least one neighbor deviates 
from NN to NG (40). Additionally, the payoff difference between a choice of N and G when 
facing previous choices corresponding to NG is 20. Hence, a player stands to lose much 
higher payoffs from choosing N repeatedly to influence G playing neighbors to choose N in 
order to earn a payoff of 90. Thus, the prospect of generating an NNN outcome is not worth 
the payoff losses needed to do so. As a result, the tendency of voluntary loss making to 
influence neighbors to choose N is weakened contributing to the decrease in the likelihood of 
efficient coordination with increasing experience. In fact debriefing of subjects after every 
session revealed that an increasing number of subjects chose G or switched from N to G 
owing to the magnitudes of the out-of equilibrium payoffs relative to the Nash equilibrium 
ones.  
 
The importance of the relative magnitudes of these out-of-equilibrium payoffs on equilibrium 
selection has been documented in relation to Stag Hunt games by Straub (1995) as well. In 
17 
 
light of this scenario, the fact that 1) extra information on the network is able to increase the 
frequency of N choices under the current adverse payoff circumstances and 2) that in the 
previous non-network AB studies information about everyone’s choices improves 
coordination strengthens our result: with more information coordination is less likely to 
unravel if the circumstances for coordination are already favorable.   
 
< Table 2 about here >  
< Figure 2 about here > 
 
Let us analyze the result more formally. Table 3 reports the shares of N choices for both 
treatments using two types of observations: average N choices for the first period taking each 
subject’s action as an independent observation (implying that there are 6 independent 
observations from 6 sessions in each cell of the table) and the same averaged over all 30 
periods for 6 groups. Using standard Mann-Whitney tests
9
 (with corresponding p-values 
presented in table 3) we find no significant treatment effect in the first period but  over the 
experimental lifetime of 30 periods there is a significant impact of information (at 5% level of 
significance).  
 
Lack of significance in Period 1 is to be expected as subjects are randomly assigned to both 
treatments, face the same payoff table, and make decisions without receiving any feedback 
about others’ choices. Considering all 30 periods together, relative to 2INFO, in 4INFO, 
subjects’ strategic uncertainty associated with choosing the risky payoff efficient strategy is 
lower since they are able to view the current and all previous choices of their direct and 
closest indirect neighbors. As a result, strategic uncertainty for many players gets resolved in 
                                                     
9
 Table I in the Appendix contains data used for the Mann-Whitney tests. 
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favor of N, leading to an upfront increase in N choices in 4INFO and significantly more N 
choices on average in 4INFO relative to 2INFO. This result holds regardless of the fact that 
owing to the adverse payoff conditions and lack of visibility of more than 50% of the 
participants’ choices, N choices fall in both treatments with repeated interactions. Our 
findings are also supportive of the theoretical model by Alós-Ferrer and Weidenholzer (2008) 
in which players successfully choose the efficient strategy when receiving information from 
two direct and two closest indirect neighbors.  
 
< Table 3 about here > 
 
Analysis of spatial patterns on local networks 
Having presented the impacts of information and repeated interactions on the frequency with 
which the Pareto efficient N choice is selected, we now analyze the location of these N 
choices and the development of the land choice configurations over multiple periods. In 
figures 3-5 we present snapshots of the network configurations in each of the six sessions for 
periods 1, 15 and 30
10
 where N choices are marked with red triangles and G choices with 
black circles. The spatial patterns in these periods reflect the difficulty of coordinating on the 
Pareto dominant all-N equilibrium. While all groups start with between 7 and 9 subjects 
(mostly adjacent) choosing N in the first period, in the final period, very few adjacent N 
choices remain.  
 
                                                     
10
 We classify our 30-period experiment into three equally spaced time intervals signifying the initial, 
intermediate and final stages. Configuration of choices from all other periods can be determined on the basis of 
data in the supplementary appendix.  
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Table 4 presents the number of groups and the earliest period in which any group reached an 
equilibrium configuration. We find that there is only one cohort which is able to reach an all-
N equilibrium in 4INFO.  This efficient land use configuration is produced in Period 7 in the 
sixth cohort and is stable with some variation till Period 22. Beyond this period, only a few 
localized N choices persist. Of the remaining five 4INFO groups, localized N choices 
transition to the all-G outcome (which is produced earliest in any of the groups in Period 23) 
in three groups. In the remaining two, only isolated N choices remain. In 2INFO on the other 
hand, all-N is never produced and the all-G outcome is obtained earliest in Period 12. This 
risk dominant network level configuration is both stable and resilient. Of the five groups that 
reach this pattern in Period 30, two groups never deviate away from it and the three which do 
revert back to it in 1-2 periods. The stability and resilience of the all-G outcome is consistent 
with theoretical evidence provided by Alós-Ferrer and Weidenholzer (2006).  
 
< Figures 3-5 about here > 
<Table 4 about here> 
 
To support a formal analysis of these land use outcomes, we construct a metric to measure the 
degree of spatial contiguity generated by the AB scheme in terms of contiguous N and G 
choices on the circular network. This metric measures the number of localized clusters of 
similar land use decisions produced by any 3 adjacent players, i.e., a player and their direct 
neighbors on the network.
11
 Formally the cluster metric reads as: 
                                                     
11
 We conducted the contiguity analysis with cluster sizes of 3 and 2 (which is a weaker measure of contiguity) 
and obtained the same qualitative results. Owing to the similarity in results and the fact that our AB game is a 
three-player game nested in a larger local network, in which a 2-sized cluster does not capture all the strategic 
effects faced by a player, we only include the 3-cluster analysis in this article.  
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    ∑                                           
   
                           (2) 
 
where                 refers to the treatment,         indicates whether the metric 
measures the share of clusters of N choices or G choices, t =1,…,30 denotes period, and     = 
1 if      or     = 0 otherwise. This metric can take a minimum value of 0 when no three 
adjacent players make the same choice implying that subjects cannot coordinate their 
decisions even within their local neighborhood where choices are always visible. The 
maximum value of the metric is K=12 which is obtained when a G or N convention is 
produced. This is because every player is at the center of one distinct local neighborhood. On 
the basis of this metric we can evaluate the development of   
   
 over time to identify how 
coordinated land use patterns on the network change during the experiment.
12
 Figure 6 
(panels a and b) and table 2 present the average values of   
      
,   
      
,   
      
, and 
  
      
 for all thirty periods.  
 
The positive values of the metric in all periods imply that the AB is able to reduce 
fragmentation of land uses and incentivize the creation of localized clusters of N and G 
choices and the all-N and all-G outcome for the enhanced delivery of ecosystem services 
such as habitat protection and biodiversity conservation. Additionally, variation in 
information available about players’ choices produces significant differences in the nature of 
these spatial patterns. Table 5 reports the p-values associated with Mann-Whitney tests for 
                                                     
12
 We do not present our analysis in terms of the N convention as it originates in only one group and in terms of 
G convention as most groups coordinate to it with increased experience regardless of treatment. The analysis of 
localized choices on the other hand is more informative in representing the variability in the land choices 
observed on the network owing to the treatment implementation and game experience.   
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the N-clustering and G-clustering metric for all 30 periods (6 independent observations per 
cell in both cases)
13
. 
 
<Insert Figures 6a and 6b about here> 
< Table 5 about here > 
 
We find that the level of N-clustering is significantly different (p-value: 0.045) in strategic 
environments with information exchange between more participants than in those where 
information flows are limited. Thus additional information incentivizes land use patterns 
corresponding to the efficient Nash equilibrium configuration at least within players’ local 
neighborhoods. However, with limited information flows and repeated interactions over all 
30 periods, nearly all subjects (69 out of 72) switch to G in 2INFO (while there are many 
subjects still selecting N in 4INFO), so that on average a significant treatment induced 
difference (p-value: 0.03) in the overall levels of G-clustering emerges as well.   
 
Analysis of individual behavior 
This section presents an analysis of factors affecting individual behavior in the experiment. 
We model the likelihood of making a socially efficient N choice as a function of a series of 
factors exogenous and lagged-endogenous to subjects within a dynamic random effects probit 
regression framework with the subject representing the random effect. The dependent 
variable is a binary variable     taking a value of 1 for an N choice and 0 for a G choice by 
subject                 in period               . 
 
                                                     
13
 Data for the Mann-Whitney tests are included in Tables II & III in the Appendix.  
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Three separate models are presented. Model I considers the impact of the two exogenous 
variables: the information treatment D to which every subject is randomly assigned and the 
Period variable denoted by   that controls for the impact of subjects’ game experience and 
familiarity within the experimental environment on their likelihood of making an N choice. In 
addition to these exogenous variables, in Model II the effect of a player’s previous period 
choice on the likelihood of selecting N in any period is considered. This variable controls for 
an effect which has been variously termed strategy inertia, a precedence effect or simply 
“force of habit”. An interaction term between the Period variable and the lagged choice is 
included to evaluate whether the role of precedence in determining the likelihood of an N 
choice in the current period varies as subjects become more experienced with the game.  
 
Since neighbors’ choices influence own action, another Model III includes a variable       
measuring the frequency of direct neighbors’ previous period N choices. This variable can 
take a value between 0 and 2, depending upon the number of neighbors selecting N. An 
interaction term between the neighbor choice variable and the Period variable is considered to 
explore the effect the frequency of neighbors’ choices have on a subject’s likelihood of 
choosing N at different levels of subject experience. A third interaction term between       
and         is included to analyze whether force of habit gets reinforced within the local 
neighborhood depending on circumstances favorable for efficient strategy choice i.e. the 
number of neighbors choosing N. All other variables from the two previous models are 
included in Model III as well.  
 
The random effects structure of the error term has a component   , which is the time 
invariant unobserved heterogeneity associated with subject i and the random component     
for every period. Expression (3) represents the full model with all variables and   the omitted 
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categories. In evaluating model performance, we use the value of the log-likelihood generated 
during the estimation.  
 
                                                                         
(                                                                                                                             (3) 
 
<Table 6 about here> 
 
Table 6 presents the regression estimates for the three models. Consistent with our prior 
discussion the information treatment dummy effect estimate is positive and significant (at 1% 
level) in all the models. We also obtain a negative and significant estimate for the Period 
variable in all models providing support for the negative trend in N choices observed for both 
treatments. This result follows from the strategic uncertainty in the game getting resolved in 
favor of G owing to the adverse payoff circumstances associated with making an N choice 
and suffering high payoff losses (20 or 70) given neighbors’ selections.  
 
Results from Model II indicate that own past behavior has a positive and significant (at 1% 
level of significance) impact on current period choice of N, i.e., subjects are significantly 
more likely to choose N if they chose N in the previous period. Thus there is a positive 
precedent for the choice of N and this effect can be attributed to strategy lock-in or strategy-
inertia (Blume 1993). Once having selected a certain strategy subjects maintain that choice 
for a few periods. The fact that this estimate is positive and significant in Model III as well 
indicates that strategy inertia may delay subjects’ response to their neighbors’ past choices for 
a few periods even if the switch may be the best response. In coordination games such as the 
AB, one explanation for the strategy lock-in is subjects’ voluntary loss-making behavior 
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(Brandts and Cooper 2006). Players voluntarily inflict payoff losses upon themselves by 
choosing N, even if their neighbors are choosing G in order to signal their sustained 
commitment towards choosing N and build a reputation for selecting N. Such costly signaling 
can be useful in reducing neighbors’ strategic uncertainty in favor of N, leading them to 
switch from G to N in subsequent periods. More generally, the precedent effect also captures 
the role of human habit in economic decision making: subjects often adhere to what they have 
done in the past regardless of consequences, since a change requires them to act consciously 
which is cognitively effortful (Kahneman 2003; Thaler and Sunstein 2008).  
 
The estimate for the interaction between precedence and Period variable is positive and 
significant in Model II. Per figure 7a that presents the marginal effect of the interaction 
between own previous choice and Period variable with 95% confidence intervals (generated 
using routines suggested by Xu and Long (2005) in Stata on the basis of Ai and Norton 
(2003)) to interpret interactions in non-linear regressions, we obtain a positive and significant 
interaction effect for all values of Period (none of the confidence intervals include 0). 
Although the estimate of the interaction term is not significant in Model III, figure 7b 
indicates a positive and significant interaction effect as well given the nature of the 
confidence intervals. Thus, per figures 7a & 7b, the effect of precedence on current choice is 
significantly different at varying levels of subject experience. With increased familiarity in 
the game habit is harder to break: an N choice made in the previous period in later phases of 
the game is more likely to be reinforced than when this choice is made in the early phases of 
the game.  
 
<Insert Figures 7a, b, c & d about here> 
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Results from Model III provide insights about the likelihood of strategy selection and 
behavior consistent with the principle of Nash equilibrium. The estimate for the number of 
direct neighbors choosing N in the previous period is positive and significant (at the 1% 
level). Sustained choice of N by neighbors reduces a subject’s strategic uncertainty in favor of 
N at least within their local neighborhood. Consequently, subjects are more likely to make an 
N choice in the current period in order to create or increase the likelihood of creating an N-
cluster at the center of which they earn a payoff of 90. This significant effect of neighbors’ 
choices – taken together with the precedent effect – explains the appearance of the all-N 
outcome and localized N clusters in both treatments.  
 
Finally, we focus on the two interaction effects which try to explain subject behavior given a 
favorable situation for efficient coordination within their local neighborhood. The estimate for 
the interaction term between the precedent and neighbors’ previous choice variable is 
positive. Figure 7c provides the diagrammatic representation of the marginal effect of 
interaction between precedent and number of neighbors selecting N in the previous period for 
three candidate Period values, 1, 15 and 30. We find the true interaction effect to be 
significant since 0 is not in any of the confidence intervals. Thus, strategy inertia associated 
with an efficient N choice is even stronger if more neighbors chose N previously.  The 
interaction term between Period variable and neighbors’ choices is positive and significant (at 
1% level of significance). Figure 7d represents the true interaction effect which is positive 
and significant and interpreted in the same manner. Thus a subject’s likelihood of selecting N 
as a function of their neighbors’ previous N choices is higher in later periods. Despite being 
more likely to choose G in order to avoid suffering payoff losses, with more experience more 
N choices in a player’s local neighborhood in the previous period may serve as a credible 
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signal to them to choose N in the current period in order to generate an N-cluster and earn 
higher payoffs.  
 
These two interaction effects pertaining to the local neighborhood represent the relative 
impact of the strategic interactions within the local neighborhood and the overall network 
environment. They suggest that the effect of direct neighbors’ choices are stronger relative to 
all indirect ones, whereby N-clusters survive in 3 of the 12 experimental sessions in the final 
Period 30, even if many subjects’ strategic uncertainty is resolved in favor of G. The value of 
the log-likelihood is the highest for Model III as well, indicating that this model most 
accurately explains the variability in subject behavior in the experiments that produces 
different spatial patterns and corresponding conservation benefit streams.  
 
Conclusion 
Improving the design of agri-environmental policy involving Payments for Ecosystem 
Services often requires attention to the spatial configurations of land uses that generate 
conservation benefits. In such cases the AB can serve as a policy mechanism to incentivize 
coordination when landowners/farmers can voluntarily choose how to manage their land. 
However, under a conservative payoff scenario, risk and payoff dominance may select 
different Nash equilibria in the AB game leading to the problem of potential coordination 
failure on the Pareto efficient equilibrium (Straub 1995). In this article, we experimentally 
investigate in the laboratory the extent of spatial coordination to the socially optimal, Pareto 
efficient land management outcome on local networks under two information conditions 
within such a payoff scenario.  
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Our study is based on the fact that both direct and indirect linkages between landowners in 
networks can impact the nature of strategic interactions and the resultant likelihood of 
coordination when information flows between landowners are limited. Then information on 
the choices of other landowners in the network can reduce strategic uncertainty and improve 
likelihood of coordination towards the socially optimal outcome. We find that spatial 
coordination to the Pareto efficient outcome is significantly higher when subjects have more 
information available about the land management choice and payoffs of their neighbors. 
 
Given that there is considerable generalizability of results from the lab to the field (Camerer 
forthcoming; Kessler and Vesterlund forthcoming), our study result lends scope for improved 
coordination to enhance ecosystem services delivery if restrictions on information exchange 
between landowners are relaxed. One of the many ways to do so would be for university 
extension staff to liaise with potential participants in an AB-type scheme in a neighborhood 
(e.g., a catchment), although this comes at a cost. Experience with conservation auctions in 
Australia suggests that such close contacts between extension personnel and farmers can be 
crucial to determining the extent of participation and the quality of outcomes (Reeson et al. 
2011). Another method would be to disseminate information in farming community networks 
through internet bulletin boards and key actors (“model”  or “demonstration” farmers) who are 
linked to many others and can serve to reduce the levels of strategic uncertainty  facilitating 
spatial coordination (Prell et al. 2009)  
 
However, despite the fact that more information induces a higher degree of coordination 
towards selecting the Pareto optimal equilibrium, over time a switch to the risk dominant 
outcome is found. Such a result is contrary to the previous AB studies by Parkhurst and 
colleagues and is a consequence besides other design aspects, of the realistic network 
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representation since this increases the strategic uncertainty of players to an extent greater than 
that in the earlier studies; and the experimental parameterization which is adverse to efficient 
coordination and was chosen keeping in mind that current conservation subsidy budgets have 
declined following the 2008 recession. In the context of improving the delivery of ecosystem 
services and other conservation benefits through land management on local networks, this 
result implies that when participants respond only to financial incentives, in the long run the 
AB may prove to be only partially effective in generating localized coordination patterns for 
ecosystem services delivery. For an environmental regulator or conservation agency who is 
constrained by tight budgets so that they cannot increase the subsidies associated with the 
conservation-friendly land management actions, finding a way of ameliorating this tendency 
of coordination to move away from the Pareto optimal outcome (maybe by appealing to 
participants’ non-economic behavioral & environmental motivations) is important if the 
conservation benefits of spatial coordination via an AB scheme are to be maintained in the 
long run.   
29 
 
Appendix 
Experimental Instructions
14
 
General Information:  
 
This is an experiment in decision making. In today's experiment you will participate in a 
group decision task which involves choosing between two actions. In addition to a $5 
participation fee, you will be paid the money you accumulate from your choices which will 
be described to you in a moment. Upon the completion of the experiment, your earnings will 
be added up and you will be paid privately, in cash. The exact amount you will receive will 
be determined during the experiment and will depend on your decisions and the decisions of 
others. From this point forward all units of account will be in experimental dollars. At the end 
of the experiment, experimental dollars will be converted to U.S. dollars at the rate of 1 U.S. 
dollars for every 150 experimental dollars. If you have any questions during the 
experiment, please raise your hand and wait for the experimenter to come to you. Please 
do not talk, exclaim, or try to communicate with other participants during the 
experiment. Participants intentionally violating the rules may be asked to leave the 
experiment and may not be paid. 
 
Group Decision Task: 
 
The experiment will have thirty periods. In each period you will be in a group with 11 other 
participants. During this experiment each of you will assume the role of a landowner who can 
                                                     
14
 In 4INFO sessions, in addition to all instructions, subjects saw the italicized text as well. In the instructions, 
strategy M refers to choice N and strategy K to choice G. We include the unchanged instructions in the article to 
maintain consistency with the actual instructions provided to the subjects during the experiment. 
30 
 
adopt one of two types of land use actions on their property. Let these land uses be denoted 
by M and K. You will receive payoffs from choosing any one of these actions. All the 
players including you are arranged around a circular which is shown on the board. The black 
dots on the circle represent the locations of your properties. On this circle, you have two 
neighbors - a clockwise (C) and an anti-clockwise (AC) neighbor. Your neighbors will be the 
same in all periods. You will never know the identity of your neighbors. Your ID will 
determine who your neighbors are. Thus if you are player 11 then your neighbors are players 
10 and 12. Player 12 has you and player 1 as neighbors. Please keep in mind that every player 
has a different set of neighbors. 
 
Your two neighbors and your neighbors’ neighbors together form your local neighborhood. 
For example if you are player 11, then players 9, 10, 12 and 1 make up your local 
neighborhood. Note that player 9 is the anti-clockwise neighbor of player 10 and player 1 is 
the clockwise neighbor of player 12.  
 
In each period, each one of you will make a choice between action M and action K. You will 
each receive money based on your choice and the choices of your neighbors. In a moment we 
will give you a detailed description of your choices and how your payment will be 
determined. Please raise your hand if there are any questions otherwise click "Continue". 
 
Your Payment from Group Decision Task:  
 
In each period of the experiment, the computer will display the table shown below. Please 
take a moment to look over the table. Whenever you are making a choice, you will be able to 
see this table. This table is the same for everyone and is the same for all thirty periods of this 
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experiment. The amounts shown in the table reflect the possible payments you might receive 
for that period. Each number in the table corresponds to a payment (in experimental dollars) 
resulting from a possible combination of your choice of M or K (row) and your clockwise & 
anti-clockwise neighbors’ choices (column). In general, your payoff increases when you 
choose the same strategy as your neighbors. 
 
Making a choice in a period:  
 
Once the period starts, each of you will choose a strategy (M or K) by clicking on one of the 
buttons that will appear on the right of your screen. You may change your choice as often as 
you like, but once you click on OK your choice for that period is final. Note that when you 
are making your choice, you will not know the choices of others. Also, remember that you 
will never know the identity of anyone else in your group, meaning that all choices are 
confidential and that no one will ever know what choices you make. 
 
At the end of each period, your screen will display your choice and payoff and the choices & 
payoffs of all players in your local neighborhood for the current period - i.e. your neighbors’ 
and your neighbors’ neighbors’ choices and payoffs. Information on your accumulated 
payment through the current period will also be provided. 
 
At the end of each period, your screen will display your choice and payoff and the choices & 
payoffs of your neighbors for the current period. Information on your accumulated payment 
through the current period will also be provided. At the end of the experiment, you will 
receive the sum of your payments from all thirty periods converted to real dollars. This will 
be paid to you privately in cash.  
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We are now ready to begin the experiment. On the next screen you will participate in a quiz. 
Please note that you will not earn any money from participating in the quiz i.e. this is a non-
paying period. Your answers in this quiz will not influence your payoffs at the end of the 
experiment. 
 
Quiz 
 
1) Suppose one of your neighbors plays strategy M and the other plays strategy K. Then your 
payoff from playing strategy M is 50 
2) My neighbor has the same neighbors as I do. FALSE 
3) Your neighbors change in every period. FALSE 
4) What is your payoff when you chose K and all your neighbors chose M? 60 
5) At the end of every period you will be able to see the choices and payoffs of your 
neighbors players in your local neighborhood. TRUE 
 
Spatial Grid 
 
< Figure about here> 
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Tables Reporting Mann-Whitney Tests 
Table I: Period 1 and Period 30 Average N Choices 
 
 Period 1 30 Period Average 
Group -Level N 
Choices 
2INFO 4INFO 2INFO 4INFO 
9 9 4.66 6.43 
7 7 1.7 3.26 
7 9 2.7 3.1 
7 10 1.66 3.7 
6 9 1.36 3.76 
9 9 2.1 10.66 
Wilcoxon Mann 
Whitney Test 
0.109 0.03 
 
Table II: Period 1 and Period 30 Average Localized N Cluster values 
 
 Period 1 30 Period Average 
3-player 
Localized N 
Clusters by 
Group 
2INFO 4INFO 2INFO 4INFO 
4 5 2.60 4.07 
2 3 0.87 1.33 
0 5 1.27 1.17 
2 8 0.27 1.73 
0 4 0.23 1.63 
4 4 0.73 9.10 
Wilcoxon Mann 
Whitney Test 
0.03 0.045 
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Table III: Period 1 and Period 30 Average Localized G Cluster values 
 Period 1 30 Period Average 
3-player 
Localized G 
Clusters by 
Group 
2INFO 4INFO 2INFO 4INFO 
0 0 5.20 3.27 
1 1 9.43 6.77 
0 0 7.77 6.90 
1 0 8.73 6.00 
0 0 9.30 6.27 
0 0 8.33 0.27 
Wilcoxon Mann 
Whitney Test 
0.93 0.03 
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Footnotes:  
1. An alternative approach investigated in the literature is auctions for spatially-
coordinated land management project procurement (e.g., Windle et al. 2009). 
2. As there are no edge effects, employing a circular network structure implies that all 
subjects face identical decision problems. This ensures that we are able to isolate the 
impact of the information treatment (that changes the subjects’ strategic uncertainty in 
the coordination game) on choices and AB performance without having to worry 
about potential confounding problems arising from subjects having different levels of 
strategic uncertainty owing to a varying number of neighbors. 
3. Of course, the third option is not participating and using the land for intensive 
agriculture. This possibility is, however, not implemented in the experiment as our 
focus is on the role of information in influencing landowners’ choice of one 
conservation strategy over the other. We thus implicitly assume that compensation is 
sufficiently generous for both conservation strategies to make participation incentive 
compatible. This assumption is not at odds with reality as PES schemes have been 
known to overcompensate landowners in order to guarantee participation (Kirwan et 
al. 2005, Munoz-Pina et al. 2008). 
4. Uncultivated or retired land,  , usually provides good habitat for those species that do 
not prefer the open nature of cultivated land, such as the boreal toad (Keinath and 
McGee 2005) and birds like the sage grouse (Crawford et al. 2004). Non-crop habitats 
on retired tracts like flower patches and hedgerows are beneficial for increasing the 
populations of natural pollinators such as honey bees (Carvell et al. 2007). On the 
other hand, the cultivated land management option   is conducive to species that like 
the “openness” of such fields. Meadow birds such as the burrowing and short-eared 
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owls (Holt and Leasure 1993) typically rely on grasslands for nesting and hunting but 
thrive less well on land retired from agriculture and abandoned to nature. 
5. By making this assumption we ignore the fact that raising funds for subsidies results 
in welfare losses to society because taxes tend to be distortionary.  
6. The reader may argue that given these modeling decisions the regulator can 
implement the optimal pattern by setting the subsidy equal to 55 or higher if 
landowners choose N, and zero otherwise. This will make choosing N a dominant 
strategy, independent of what the other landowners choose – there is no coordination 
problem. While this is correct, this scheme is not informative in explaining how 
subjects behave in the presence of subsidies where their payoffs depend on both their 
own and others’ decisions. Moreover, in the real world the regulator may not be fully 
aware of both the opportunity costs of land conservation and the conservation benefits 
from agglomeration. Then paying landowners the social benefits of their actions 
would ensure that social welfare is maximized with certainty. 
7. Following Harsanyi and Selten (1988), the deviation loss associated with G is 70 and 
with N is 30.  
8. In order to keep the instructions simple, we used the phrase local neighborhood in the 
instructions for 4INFO sessions to refer to the set of direct & indirect neighbors 
whose responses would be visible to players in all periods. However, in the Results 
section of the article, the phrase local neighborhood refers to the set of direct 
neighbors only. 
9. Table I in the Appendix contains data used for the Mann-Whitney tests. 
10. We classify our 30-period experiment into three equally spaced time intervals 
signifying the initial, intermediate and final stages. Configuration of choices from all 
other periods can be determined on the basis of data in the supplementary appendix.   
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11. We conducted the contiguity analysis with cluster sizes of 3 and 2 (which is a weaker 
measure of contiguity) and obtained the same qualitative results. Owing to the 
similarity in results and the fact that our AB game is a three-player game nested in a 
larger local network, in which a 2-sized cluster does not capture all the strategic 
effects faced by a player, we only include the 3-cluster analysis in this article.  
12. We do not present our analysis in terms of the N convention as it originates in only 
one group and in terms of G convention as most groups coordinate to it with increased 
experience regardless of treatment. The analysis of localized choices on the other 
hand is more informative in representing the variability in the land choices observed 
on the network owing to the treatment implementation and game experience.   
13. Data for the Mann-Whitney tests are included in Tables II & III in the Appendix.  
14. In 4INFO sessions, in addition to all instructions, subjects saw the italicized text as 
well. In the instructions, strategy M refers to choice N and strategy K to choice G. We 
include the unchanged instructions in the article to maintain consistency with the 
actual instructions provided to the subjects during the experiment. 
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Table 1: Summary of Parameter Values and Game Payoffs 
Market return to abandoned land: r      
Market return to managed agricultural land: r(G) = 55 
Participation component abandoned land:         
Participation component managed agricultural land:        
Bonus component abandoned land:         
Bonus component managed agricultural land:         
 Direct neighbors’ choices 
Landowner choice          
  90 50 10 
  60 70 80 
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Table 2: Average Share of N Choices and Cluster Metric by Period and Treatment 
 
Period 
Average N Choice N-Clustering G-Clustering 
2INFO 4INFO 2INFO 4INFO 2INFO 4INFO 
1 0.63 0.74 2.00 4.83 0.33 0.17 
2 0.61 0.67 4.00 4.17 1.00 0.83 
3 0.51 0.68 3.00 5.00 2.67 1.17 
4 0.51 0.61 3.50 3.83 3.00 2.00 
5 0.49 0.65 2.50 4.67 2.83 1.50 
6 0.46 0.65 3.33 4.33 4.17 1.33 
7 0.36 0.65 2.33 5.33 5.67 1.83 
8 0.32 0.61 1.67 5.17 5.83 2.50 
9 0.33 0.53 1.67 3.67 5.50 3.17 
10 0.25 0.47 1.00 3.50 6.67 3.67 
11 0.22 0.39 0.83 2.83 7.33 5.67 
12 0.17 0.39 0.50 2.50 8.00 5.50 
13 0.17 0.40 0.83 3.50 8.50 5.83 
14 0.14 0.43 0.67 3.33 9.00 5.17 
15 0.11 0.40 0.50 3.33 9.33 5.67 
16 0.08 0.39 0.33 3.17 10.00 5.67 
17 0.08 0.38 0.17 3.00 9.67 5.83 
18 0.07 0.35 0.17 2.83 10.17 6.17 
19 0.03 0.35 0.00 2.83 11.00 6.17 
20 0.01 0.36 0.00 3.00 11.50 6.17 
21 0.03 0.38 0.00 3.17 11.33 5.83 
22 0.06 0.38 0.33 3.17 11.00 5.83 
23 0.03 0.33 0.00 2.50 11.33 6.50 
24 0.03 0.32 0.00 2.33 11.33 6.67 
25 0.04 0.29 0.17 2.00 11.17 6.67 
26 0.03 0.26 0.00 1.67 11.33 6.67 
27 0.06 0.26 0.17 1.50 10.67 7.00 
28 0.03 0.18 0.00 1.17 11.17 8.83 
29 0.03 0.21 0.00 1.50 11.17 8.50 
30 0.04 0.18 0.17 1.33 11.17 8.83 
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Table 3: Mean Shares and Standard Deviations (in parentheses) of N Choices for Period 
1 and all 30 Periods 
 
Share of N choices 
Treatment 
Mann Whitney 
Test 
2INFO 4INFO p-value 
Average in Period 1 
0.63 
(0.98) 
0.74 
(1.22) 
0.11 
Averaged over all 30 
periods 
0.19 
(1.22) 
0.43 
(5.16) 
0.03 
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Table 4: Number of Groups and Earliest Period in which N and G Conventions 
Reached 
 
2INFO 4INFO 
 
# of groups 
reach at least 
once 
Period in which first 
originated 
# of groups 
reach at least 
once 
Period in which 
first originated 
all-N 0 -- 1 7 
all-G 5 12 3 23 
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Table 5: Mean Shares of Localized N and G Cluster for Period 30  
 
Averaged over all 
30 periods  
Treatment 
Mann Whitney 
Test 
2INFO 4INFO p-value 
Share of N clusters 
0.10 
(0.08) 
0.3 
(0.25) 
0.045 
Share of G clusters 
0.70 
(0.12) 
0.44 
(0.23) 
0.03 
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Table 6: Results of Random Effects Probit Regressions for Land Management Decisions 
 
Explanatory Variables 
Probit (=1 if strategy N is chosen) 
Model I Model II Model III 
Information Treatment Dummy 
1.241 ** 
(0.262) 
0.737*** 
(0.157) 
0.199** 
(0.092) 
Period 
-0.108*** 
(0.004) 
-0.075*** 
(0.006) 
-0.037*** 
(0.009) 
Action in Previous Period -- 
1.354*** 
(0.136) 
1.39*** 
(0.188) 
Action in Previous Period   Period -- 
0.029*** 
(0.008) 
0.003 
(0.009) 
Number of Neighbors Choosing N in 
Previous Period  
-- -- 
0.812*** 
(0.116) 
Number of Neighbors  
Choosing N  in Previous Period   Period 
-- -- 
0.024*** 
(0.006) 
Action in Previous Period   Number of  
Neighbors Choosing N in Previous 
Period 
-- -- 
0.102 
(0.111) 
Constant 
0.058 
(0.31) 
-0.78*** 
(0.143) 
-1.755*** 
(0.164) 
Log Likelihood -1446.9489 -1073.4032 -868.329 
           
Note: *** and **, represent significance at 1% and 5%.  
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